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It is shown that the first order multivalued equation for V = V(t, x, y, z) involving 
the sum of two subdifferentials composed with the partials of V (V, +f(t, x, y, z) . 
Vx V + /?( V,,) + y(V,) + h(t, x, y, z) 3 0 a.e.) has a Lipschitz solution. This solution 
is shown to be the value of a differential g me in which the players are restricted to 
choosing monotone nondecreasing functions of time. Accordingly, the multivalued 
equation is interpreted asthe corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equation of the game. 
Suppose one considers the multivalued differential system of first order for 
the function V = V(t, x, y, z) on [0, T] x R m x [0, 1 ] x [0, 1 ] 
y +f(t, 4 y, 2) * v, v + P( Vy) + Y(V,> + h(f, x3 Y, z) 3 0 a.e. (0.1) 
with some initial-boundary conditions. Here p and y are given by 
P(r) = 0 r<O Y(r) = 0 r>O 
= P, a) r=O = (-co, O] r=O 
= empty r>O = empty r < 0. 
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Then p and -y are subdifferentials of convex functions. Before one considers 
existence of a solution one must appropriately interpret the problem (0.1). If 
one considers the simpler problem to find W = W(t, x, y) satisfying 
W, +f(t, x, y) . V, W + 8( WY) + h(t, x, y) 3 0 
the interpretation is 
a.e. 
wya Wt+faV,W+h&O a.e. 
W,( W, +f . V, W + h) = 0 a.e. 
or, equivalently, WY & 0 a.e. and 
(0.2) 
(0.3) 
ess.~up{(W,+f.V,W+h)(t,x,JT); W(t, x, y) = W(t, x, P)} = 0. (0.4) 
This was shown in Barron-Jensen [3] to be solved by the value function W 
of an optimal control problem over the class of monotone nondecreasing 
functions in [0, l] starting at the fixed position y E [0, 11. 
For (O.l), an interpretation in the form of inequalities (0.2), (0.3) is not 
sufficient to characterize V. It turns out that the interpretation (0.4) for W 
can be extended to determine the appropriate interpretation of (0.1). In fact, 
we consider the problem (0.1) as one of finding a function V(t, x, y, z) 
satisfying almost everywhere, VY < 0 < P’, and 
ess.Csup essbinf[ Vl +f e V, I/ + h](t, x, jj, F) 
=essbinfess.csup[V,+f.V,P’+h](t,x,y,F)=O (0.5) 
where 
c= {Y<.F< 1; V(t,x,y,z)= Jq,x,Xz)}, 
D={z~z91;V(t,x,y,z)=V(t,x,y,~)}. 
We will prove that (0.5) has a Lipschitz continuous solution V with 
v(t, x, y, z) given as the value function for a differential game in which the 
maximizer and minimizer must choose a monotone nondecreasing function 
in [0, l] starting at the fixed positions y and z, respectively. 
To prove this result we introduce the study of monotone differential games 
in Sections 1-3, establishing in Section 3 that (0.5) is the Bellman equation 
for the game. In Section 4, we return to the optimal control problem to 
discuss optimal play and some problems regarding the characterizatiori of 
the free boundary. No results in this direction are yet known for either the 
optimal control problem or the much more complex differential game. The 
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first order case is in general more difficult than the second order problem 
which corresponds to a stochastic control problem involving a Weiner 
process. Smoothness of the derivatives i not expected to hold in the first 
order case. 
1. DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH MONOTONE CONTROL FUNCTIONS 
In this section we consider a two person, zero sum differential g me with 
ordinary differential equations as dynamics for which the control functions 
are required to be monotone nondecreasing with values in (0.11. We will 
establish basic properties ofthis game in this section. 
We assume the reader is familiar with the general theory of differential 
games as presented in Friedman [4, 51. In particular, one should be familiar 
with the notion and notation for an upper and lower b-game. 
Let T be a positive real number and let R”’ denote euclidean m-space. For 
0 <y < 1, 0 < z < 1 and 0 < t < T define the following classes of control 
functions: 
Y,,[t, 7’1 = {rl: It, Tl -+ 10, 1 I I v(t) =Y, 
v monotone nondecreasing on [0, 1 ] } 
Z,[t, T] = {C: [t, T] -, [O, 11 1 t;(t) = z, 
[ monotone nondecreasing on [0, 1 ] }. 
For each q E Y,,[t, T], C E Z,[t, T], x E R”’ solve the system 
&/d~=f(~, t(7)> v(r), 47)) t<r,<T 
at) = x 
where f is a given function satisfying the condition 
(a) fis uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (t, x, y, z) 
and satisfies a linear growth condition in x, y, z. 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
We are given the following payoff functional 
P t,x,y,h, 0 = MT)) + jt’ h(s, T(s), v(s), C(s)) ds (1.3) 
where < is the solution of (1. l), (1.2) corresponding to q E Y, and [E Z,, 
and h and g are given functions atisfying 
(b) h and g are uniformly Lipschitz continuous functions 
of their arguments. 
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We assume that (a) and (b) hold throughout his paper. However, the results 
will be true for weaker assumptions about f, g, and h. 
The functions q are chosen out of Y, and the functions c are chosen out of 
Z, so as to maximize and minimize, respectively, thepayoff unctional (1.3). 
Exactly how this game is to be played on the time interval [t, T] is described 
in Friedman [4]. 
We denote the monotone upper and lower a-strategies forq by Ts and r,, 
respectively, and those for c by As, A,, respectively. The upper and lower 6- 
values are then given by 
and 
respectively. Note that the inf s and sup’s in the middle of (1.4) and (1.5) can 
be interchanged but those at the end of (1.4), (1.5) cannot, in general. 
The monotone upper and lower values of this game can readily be shown 
to exist and are given by 
V+ = limo V”, V- = lim V s+o 6’ 
respectively. The numbers V+ and VP depend on the initial time t, the initial 
state position x, and the initial control positions y and z. Henceforth, we will 
consider V* as real valued functions on [0, T] x R” x [0, l] x [0, 11. Our 
first result will show, however, that these reduce to one function. 
THEOREM 1. For each (t, x, y, z) the monotone differential game has 
value V(t, x, y, z). That is, V(t, x, y, z) = Vt (t, x, y, z) = V(t, x, y, z). 
Remark. When f and h are nonlinear functions of the controls the 
Theorem 1 is generally false when the controls are allowed to be any 
measurable functions. Under this freedom, a sufficient condition for value to 
exist is the Isaacs condition [5] which refers to the existence of a saddle 
point for the associated Hamiltonian. We are not assuming the Isaacs 
condition here. 
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 1 will follow exactly as in 
Friedman [4, Theorem 2.3.11 once we establish t at the classes of functions 
Y,,[t, T] and Z,[t, T] are compact in L”, 1 <p< co, for then the shift 
operator on Yy and Z, is uniformly equicontinuous in Lp and Friedman’s 
Lemma 2.3.1 will follow even for nonlinear f and h. 
Consider only Y,,. By Helly’s compactness theorem subsequences in Y), 
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converge to elements of Yy pointwise on [t, T]. Since sequences in Yy are 
bounded, Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem then implies 
convergence in Lp, 1 <p < co. Hence Y, is compact in Lp. 
A monotone strategy for v is a sequence r, = {r,}, of monotone lower 6- 
strategies and a monotone strategy for i is a sequence A, = {A,}, of 
monotone lower a-strategies so that any &outcome (v8, cs) of (A,, I’,) 
satisfies v8 E Y, and Cs E Z,. 
Given a pair of monotone strategies (A,, r,) with A, = {A,}, r, = {r,}, let 
(rs, c$) denote the b-outcome of (As, r,) for each 6. By Helly’s theorem and 
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, then, there is a subsequence (6’ ) 
of {6}, and a pair (v,<) with rEY,, [EZ, so that qsJ+q and &,--SC 
pointwise and in L I. We call (q, [) a monotone outcome of (A,, I’,). If we let 
c$, and < be the trajectories corresponding to (vs, &) and (7, 0, respectively, 
then by conditions (a), (b) it follows that as 6’ + 0 
and 
P(rlp, r,o + P(% r;). (1.7) 
Since there may be many outcomes of a pair (A,, I’,) we let P[A,, r,] 
denote the set {P(Q C) 1 (r, [) is an outcome of (A,, I’,,)}. 
A pair of monotone strategies (Af, r,*) is a monotone saddle point for 
W, x, Y, z) if 
for any pair (A,, r,,). (Two sets A, B satisfy A < B if a < b Va E A, b E B.) 
Note that for any pair of monotone strategies (A, r), P[A, r] # 0 even for 
nonlinear f and h. This is not generally true (cf. Friedman [4]) when 
measurable controls are allowed. 
A very useful property of monotone games is that they always have a 
saddle point. 
THEOREM 2. For each (t, x, y, z) a monotone saddle point exists. 
ProoJ Following Friedman [4, p. 501, there exist monotone &strategies 
A,* and r,* so that 
v” > P[A,*, rs] - 6, va <P[r,*,A”] +a 
for any Ts and As. Put A,* = {AZ}, r,* = {Q}. If r,, = {r,} is any monotone 
strategy for r and (vs, &) is the outcome of (A,*, r,) then we have 
ms, r,> < vs + 6. 
70 BARRON ANDJENSEN 
Let (8’ } be a subsequence of {a} so that (pointwise) qs, -+ v, Cs, + [. Then by 
(1.6), (1.7) we have P(q8,,&,)+P(n,Q < V. Hence {I’} >P[A,*,r,,], Vr,. 
Similarly {V} < P[A,, Ty*], VA,. 
A result we will find useful ater is the following. Its proof is obvious. 
COROLLARY 1. 
V(t,x,y,z)=i~~s~pP[A,,~~]=s~~i~fP[A,,~~]=P[AP,~~] 
Y i 
where, by infAr supry P[AZ, r,,] is meant inf,= supry sup{ a 1 a E P[A,, r,] } and 
supry infAZ P[A,, rY] means supry infbZ inf{b 1b E P[A,, I’,]}. 
2. PROPERTIES OF THE MONOTONE VALUE FUNCTION 
THEOREM 3. V(t, x, y, z) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in compact 
subsets of [0, T] x R” x [0, l] x [0, l] and has a total derivative almost 
everywhere. Almost everywhere here refers to Lebesgue measure on [0, T] x 
R” x [0, l] x [0, 11. 
The proof that V is Lipschitz is similar to that of Theorem 2.4 in Barron- 
Jensen [2]. Once this is established the second assertion follows from 
Rademacher’s theorem. 
PROPOSITION 1. V(t, x, y, z) is nondecreasing in z E [0, 1 ] and nonin- 
creasing in y E [0, 11. 
Proof: Let 0 < y < y’ < 1. For E > 0 there is an upper S-strategy rtr so 
that 
w, X,Y', 2) < PK-, r;Tm + e 
for all C E Z,. Define I’; by r:([)(r) = y if t = t and 
W(r) = rX)(4 if t<s<T. 
Then we have r: E Yy and 
v% x, Yfl Z) G w, r;(o) + E 
and so taking inf sup we have V’(t, x, y’, z) < V’(t, x, y, z). Letting 6+ 0 the 
result follows. The other assertion issimilar. 
Define O<y+< 1 and O<z+ < 1 by 
f- + Y -Yf,x,z =max{Y I Y<Y< 1, V(t,x,y,z)= V(t,x,J,z>} 
z+ =z+ f,x,y = max{f( z < .?< 1, V(t,x, y, z) = V(t, x, y, F)}. 
Since V is continuous, y’ and z’ are well defined. 
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PROPOSITION 2. There exists a monotone saddle point in strategies 
(A,*, I’,“) for V(t, x, y, z) so that if (Q C) is any outcome of (A:, I’,*) then 
v(t) =y, r(t’) =y+ and C(t) = z, C(t+) = z+. 
ProojI Let (A,*, r,*+) be a saddle point for V(t, x, y ‘, z) and let A, = {A,} 
be any monotone strategy for <. The claim is made that every r]-outcome of 
(A,, r,*) satisfies q(t) = q(t+ ) = y ‘. Indeed, if (Q [) is an outcome of 
(A,, r,*c) and rz+ = {Ti’}, then there is a subsequence, again denoted by {6}, 
so that qs -+ v and {a -+ [ pointwise where (qs, &J is a &outcome of 
(As, rz’). Now, if q(t+) > y’ then there is a y so that v(t’) > y > yt and 
qs(tt ) > y > y+ for small 6. Also 
Modify ri’ into f8 so that any q outcome f8 of (A,, f8) satisfies 
es(t) = y, qs(r) = vs(t) if t < r < T. Then we have 
which implies that V(t, x, yt, z) < V”(t, x, y, z) + O(S). Letting 6 + 0 we 
have V(t, x, y ‘, z) < V(t, x, y, z). But y > y ’ implies V(t, x, y +, z) > 
V(t, x, y, z). Hence equality holds. Then V(t, x, y, z) is constant on [y, y] 
which contradicts the definition of y ‘. 
Similarly, if (A,*,, r,*i) is a saddle point for V(t, x, y’, z +) then every 
outcome (II, C) of (A,*,, r,*) sat’ f lslesq(t)=~(t’)=y+ and<(t)=C(t+)=z+. 
Since y+ >y and zf >z and 
(A,*,, r,*t) can be modified at t = t into a saddle point (A*, r*) satisfying the 
assertions of the proposition. 
Remark. Using the notation ry and A, to indicate that an outcome (q, [) 
satisfies q E Y,,, [E Z, the above proposition shows that the assertion holds 
for r,* played against any monotone A, and for A,* played against any 
monotone r,. Moreover, the following pairs all form saddle points for 
v(t, X, y, z): (A,*, r,*), (A;, r,*+), (A,*,, r,*), and (A,*, r,*+). In fact, (AT, I$) is 
- - a saddle point for V(t,x,y,z) for y<y<y+ and z<Z<z+. 
The following is fundamental and is known as the principle of optimality 
or principle of dynamic programming. 
PROPOSITION 3. Let E > 0. Then the strategies A,*, r,* given in 
Proposition 3 and the monotone value function satisfy 
(i) V(t, x, y, z) = l:tE h(s, l*, v*, C*) ds + V(t + E, r*(t + E), 
r*(t + E), I;*(t + E)) for (q*, c*) any outcome of (A,*,r,*) and <* the 
corresponding trajectory. 
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(ii) W, X,Y, z)< j:+‘h(s, t, v*, C) ds + W + E, t(t + e), r*(t + c), 
&t + E)) for any outcome (r*, [) of (A,, I’,*) given any monotone A, and r is 
the corresponding trajectory. 
(iii) W, x, Y, z) > ii+’ h(s, t, rl, C*) ds + W + E, t(t + E), r(t + ~1, 
c*(t + e))fir any outcome (Q [*) of(A,*, r,) given any monotone ry and r is 
the corresponding trajectory. 
ProoJ We will prove only (ii); the others are similar. 
Let r; = {r,*}, A, = {A,} and define a sequence {k} of positive integers so 
that E = k6 remains constant, 6 = (T - t)/n. 
For each 6 we have 
r,* = v-s*,,,..., qk  qk+ , ..., r,* ,,) = v% G+7 
A, = (As,l,...,Ad,k,As,k+l,...,As,n)= {A’,,A’,+“} 
where, with an abuse of notation, rb E Yy[& t + E], rgtE E Yrlg,t+El[t + E,T] 
and Ai E Z,[t, t+ E], AtteE Z,;,,,,,[t + E, T]. 
Hence, I’,* and A, can be split mto two monotone strategies each 
so that 
r,* = (rt, rt+y: rt = {r;}, rt+E= {rg’y, 
A, = (A’, A’+‘): A’ = {A;}, At+E= {Af’“), 
rt E Yy[t,  + E], At E Z,[t, t+ E], rtteE Y,-,(f+E)[t + E,T], and 
AttEE ZAr(t+c). 
Then we have by Corollary 1
where (q*, [) is an outcome of (A’, r’) on [t, t+ E]. Hence 
h(s, 4, q*, [) ds + inf sup P[AtiE, rt+‘] 
AI+Ert+E 
I 
tte 
= h(s, t-, rl*, C) ds + W + G t(t + ~1, v*(t + ~1, CO + ~1). 
t 
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3. THE FIRST-ORDER SYSTEM SOLVED BY V(t,x,y,z) 
To motivate the system which will be-derived in this section suppose that 
(r*, [*) is a saddle point in monotone functions without reference to 
strategies and let <* be the corresponding “optimal” trajectory. Evaluate V 
along (t, c*(t), r*(t), c*(t)) and differentiate formally at (t, xy, z) to get 
V,+V;f(t,x,y,z)+V;Ij*+V;r’*+h(t,x,y,z)=0. (3.1) 
Analogous with the standard theory of differential games, fi* E [0, co) 
maximizes and t* E [0, co) minimizes the left hand side of (3.1). Since 
V,<O and V,>O, when V,,<O, d*=O and when V,>O, <*=O. On the 
other hand when, say, V, = 0, fl* has the freedom to be any nonnegative 
number. Hence, jumps or continuous increase are both possibilities. The
choice for 4 * is determined by solving I’,,(& X,y, z) = 0 for y and the choice 
for <* is determined by solving V,(t, x,y, z) = 0 for z. This is clearly a 
nontrivial, if not impossible, task. In all situations, however, it is true that 
V,,rj* ,< 0 and V,[* > 0. Formally, this results in the multivalued first order 
evolution equation for V, 
aV/at+f-V,V+P(V,)+y(VJ+h30 a.e. (3.2) 
where 
P(r) = 0 r<O y(r) = 0 r>O 
= 10, a> r=O = (-Go, O] r=O 
= empty r>O = empty r < 0. 
When only one subdifferential forming an equation similar to (3.2) 
appears, existence of a Lipschitz solution has been established in Barron- 
Jensen [3]. When two subdifferentials appear as in (3.2) existence will be 
provided by Theorem 4 below. The appropriate interpretation f (3.2) is 
given there. 
THEOREM 4. The monotone value function V satisfies the following 
system for almost every (t, x, y, z) E [0, T) X R” X [0, 1) X 10, 1): 
av/ay < 0, a vpz > 0; (3.3) 
a V(f, x, y, z>/at +f(t, x, Y + 3 z).V,V(t,x,y,z)+h(t,x,y+,z)~O; 
(3.4) 
W(t, x, y, z)/at +j-(t, x,y, z’) . V,V(t, x, y, z) + h(t, X,Y, z’) < 0; 
(3.5) 
~V(t,x,y,z)/~t+f(t,x,y+,z+)~V~V(t,x,y,z)+h(t,x,~+,z+)=0; 
(35) 
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where 
y+ =max{y,<y< 1; V(t,x,y,z)= V(t,x,J,z)} 
z+ =max{z<i< 1; V(t,x,y,z)= V(t,x,y,F)}; 
ess. inf ess. sup A V(t, x, Y; .F) = ess. sup ess. inf A V(t, x, p, F) = 0; (3.7) 
z<T<z+ Y<ixY+ y<y<y+ r<i<zt 
where 
A W, x, Y, z) = Vj(t, x, Y, z> +f(t, x, Y, z> . V, V(t, x, Y, z> + h(f, x, Y, z). 
Further, V satisfies the terminal-boundary conditions 
V(T, 4 Y, z) = g(x) O<y< l,xER”,O<z< 1 (3.8) 
V(t, x, 1, z) = Q(h x, z) O<t<T,xER”‘,O<z,< 1 (3.9) 
w, x, Y, 1) = & 4 Y> O<t,<T,xERm,O<y< 1 (3.10) 
where 
#(t, x z) = min 
S~Z,If,Tl 
Pj,x,,,z(L I;> and ~4, X,Y> = max P, x y ,(rl, 1) 
neY,[f,Tl ’ ’ ’ 
are value functions for the optimal control problem (one player d@erential 
game) with the indicated payoffs and dynamics [ = f (r,<, 1, [), l(t) = x for $ 
and t =f CT, 6 r, I>, t(t) = x for v/. 
Remark. It was shown in [3] that 4 satisfies 
4j(4 x, z) +f(t, x, 1, z> . v,#(t, x, z) + h(t, x, 1, z) > 0 a.e. 
fb,(t, x z) > 0 a.e. 
and 
4z(h +f. V,# + h) = 0 
or, equivalently, 
#t +f. Vx4 + h + YW 3 0. 
Also 
#(T, x, z) = g(x), $a 4 1) = PfJ,l,l(l~ 1). 
Similarly v satisfies 
w,(t, x, Y> +f (6 x, Y, 1) . V, v(t, x, Y> + W, x, Y, 1) < 0 
~~(6 x, Y) < 0 a.e. 
a.e. 
MONOTONE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 15 
and 
with 
v’t +f. v,v + h + P(w,> 3 0 
w(T XT Y> = g(x), wh 4 1) =Pt,x,,,*(l, 1). 
Both d and w are uniformly Lipschitz continuous functions of their 
arguments in compact subsets. It was also shown that Q and w satisfy, 
respectively, 
ess. inf [f+(t, x, f) +f(t, X, 1, F) . V,#(t, X, z) + h(t, X, 1, z)] = 0 
[z(I(z+) 
and 
ess. SUP [w,@, x, 17+f(k x, A 1) . V, ~(6 x, Y) + h(t, x, 7, l)] = 0. 
lY<F<Y+l 
Note also that for all O<y< 1, O<z< 1 
and 
$(t, x, 1) = W(C x, 1). 
Proof of Theorem 4. The first assertion (3.3) follows from Proposition 1. 
The terminal-boundary conditions (3.8)-(3.10) follow immediately from 
the definitions and the Lipschitz continuity of V, 4, and w. Thus it remains to 
establish (3.4)-(3.7). 
We will first show that (3.4) holds; (3.5) is similar. 
Let (t, x, y, z) be a point of differentiability for V. Let (A,*, r,*) be a saddle 
point for I’(t, x, y, z) with q*(t) =y, q*(t’) = y’ and i*(t) = z, [*(t’) = Z+ 
for any outcome (q*, C*) of (d,*,r,*). Then if z < .F< z+, y<y<y+, 
(AT, r$) is also a saddle point for I’(t, x,7, F) with C*(t) = F, C*(t’) = z+, 
q*(t) ‘J, q*(t+) = y+. We repeatedly use the fact that V(t, x, y, z) = 
I’(t,x,y,F) for all y<Y<y’ and z<Z<z+. 
Given a strategy Ai for [, denote by (n*, [) an outcome of (A,-, T’,*). Then, 
by Proposition 3, we have for E > 0 
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where c corresponds to (v*, Q. In particular this holds for the constant 
strategy A,= {F}, z <z< z+ and so 
E-‘[V(t+E,r(t+E),I?*(t+E),~)--(t,X,y,~)] 
i 
fi& 
+ EC’ h(s, r(s), 9 *(s), F) ds > 0. (3.11) 
f 
Let <+ (5) be the trajectory on t < z < t + E corresponding to the constant 
monotone controls y+ and P with r+(t) = x. Then 
E-‘[l/(t+E,r(t+E),T1*(t+E),~)- V(t,x,y,23] 
=E-‘[V(t+E,r(t+E),r*(t+E),~) 
- V(t + E, r+ (I + E), V*(t + E), F)] 
+&-‘[V(t+E,r+(t+E),~*(t+E),~)- V(t+E,r+(t+E),y+,y)l 
+&-‘[V(t+E,~+(t+E),y+,~)--(1,x,y+,~)] 
= 1; + 1; + 1; (3.12) 
since V(t, x, y, z) = V(t, x, y, 5) = V(t, X, .Y+, .Q We will show that 
lim 1: = 0 (3.13) 
E’O 
and 
lim 1; = 0. (3.14) 
E’O 
To see (3.13), use Gronwall’s inequality to get 
s tte I @t + E) - t+ (t + &)I < c 1 /11*(+Y+Ids=w (3.15) 
since q*(t’ ) = y ‘. The Lipschitz continuity of V then implies (3.13). 
To see (3.14), since r*(t + E) > yt and V is nonincreasing in y, we have 
1; < 0 for all E > 0. Hence lim sup_0 14 < 0. On the other hand, by the 
definition of r,* we have 
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Hence 
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Therefore, by the continuity of h, (3.13) and (3.15) 
0 < lim inf(Z; + ZE,) = lim+rrf Z;, 
E-0 
and so (3.14) is true. 
NowconsiderZ”,.Foranyy<y<y+,z,<Y<z+ wehave 
I;=&-‘[V(t+E,(+(t+E),y+,F)- V(t,x,y+,5)] 
=E-l[V(t+E,~+(t+E),y+,~)--(t+E,~+(t+E),~,~)] 
+E-‘[V(t+E,r+(t+E),y;~)- qt,x,v;f)] 
~E-‘[V(t+E,r+(t+E),y;~)- v-(t,x,.F,q]. 
- - Since for almost every (t, x, y, z) V is differentiable at almost every (t, x, y, z) 
(cf. [6, Lemma A.2, p. 501) we have 
lim sup 1: < aV(t, x, jJ, f)/>lat +f(t, x, yf, JY) .V, v(t, x,Y; Z). (3.16) 
E--10 
Combining (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), and (3.16), we have 
W(t, x, J, q/at +f(t, x, y+, q . v, V(t, x, y, f) + h(t, x, y+, Z) > 0 (3.17) 
- - for almost every (t, x, y, z), y ,<y< y+, z < .Y< z’. Hence (3.4) holds. 
Similarly 
W(t,x,y; F)/)lat +f(t,x,J,z+) - VxV(t,x,y,~) + h(t,x,jj,z+)<O (3.18) 
and so (3.5) is true. Combining (3.17) and (3.18) we see that (3.6) is also 
true. 
Finally, to see (3.7) simply write 
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Then, by (3.17) and the Lipschitz continuity off and h we have 
ess. sup ess. inf A V(t, x, jr, 5) > 0. 
Y<F<Yf r<I<z+ 
(3.19) 
Similarly, using (3.18) we have 
ess. inf ess. sup A V(t, x, U; F) < 0. 
z<I<z+ Y<FsY+ 
(3.20) 
Since the left side of (3.19) is never greater than the left side of (3.20) 
equality holds in (3.19) and (3.20) and so (3.7) is true. This completes the 
proof of Theorem 4. 
Remark. Let Yr be the class of monotone increasing functions ?,r on 
[t, T] with 0 < q Q 1, q(t) =y and q Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant M. 
Similar definition for Zf. Let V”*L be the value function for the differential 
game played with these classes of functions. Then V“‘,L will satisfy almost 
everywhere 
V “;*” +f(t, x, y, z) * v, v”*L +M(PyL)+ 7qvy- +h(t,x,y,z)=O 
(3.21) 
and the same internal-boundary conditions (3.8)-(3.10) except using 
YY, zf. 
By direct methods (i.e., using differential g mes techniques) one can show 
that 
lim 
M,L-rm 
V”,“(t, x, y, z) = V(t, x, y, z) 
and hence a solution of (3.21) converges to a solution of (3.3)-(3.10). 
4. OPTIMAL PLAY FOR THE ONE-PLAYER CASE AND OPEN PROBLEMS 
Here we discuss the construction fthe optimal control for the one-player 
differential g me. 
V(t, x, y) = 
where 
&/dr =f(r, t, r> t<z<T 
&)=xE R”. 
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As shown in [3], there exists an optimal control q* E Y4[t, T] with 
r*(f)=Y, v*@+)=Y+; V satisfies almost everywhere 
vy < 0, v, + v&f-+ h ,< 0, (4.2) 
V,( v, + v&f+ h) = 0 (4.3) 
and 
ess. sup [ V,(t, x, J) +f(t, x, j) * V, V(h x, F) + h(b x, J)l = 0. (4.4) 
lY<Y<Y+l 
Now, V, < 0 is equivalent to the condition 
V(L 4 Y) > V(t, x3 Y + Y) for all y > 0, y + y < 1. 
In this context it is natural to consider the quasi-variational inequality 
v:+ v;y+lz<o (4.5) 
Vk(f, X, J’) > M, Vk(& 4 y) = -k + SUP V”(t, X, y + 7) (4.6) 
Y>O 
YtY<l 
(Vk-MkVk)(v;+ v;*f+h)=O (4.7) 
and let k + 0. 
The equations (4.5)-(4.7) model the value function for an impulse control 
problem. The optimal impulse control may be constructed as in Aubin [ 1, 
p. 5 181 for each k > 0. One then obtains a sequence of controls yf and a 
sequence of value functions Vk. It is an open problem whether yc and Vk 
converge to the monotone optimal control and monotone value function, 
respectively. 
For the monotone optimal control problem the sets 
c= {(hx,y): V,(~,X,Y> <O) 
and 
S = {(I, x, y): V,(t, x, y) = 0) = complement of C 
can be used to formdly construct an optimal control. This construction 
depends on the free boundary separating C and S. Formally, consider Fig. 1. 
If (t, y) starts in C then it is optimal to not jump at all; merely play the 
constant control y until one reaches the free boundary of C. At this time, if 
the free boundary is an increasing curve, one follows the curve to its highest 
point, while it is still increasing. Upon reaching this highest point, play the 
new constant control as long as the dynamics remain in C. If one should hit 
the boundary again the above procedure is repeated. Notice here that the 
409/91/l-6 
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FIGURE 1 
fundamental problem involves the second derivative of the value function in 
that optimal play is formally the y-solution of VJt, x, y) = 0. The implicit 
function theorem requires the nonvanishing of V,, for even local solvability 
for y. 
In the differential game situation there are two free boundaries: where 
V, = 0 and V,, = 0. Clearly, the situation is much more complicated, both in 
studying the free boundaries and in determining optimal play. 
Finally, Barron [7] contains the construction of an optimal monotone 
control for a model of consumption of an exhaustible resource. The con- 
struction is via the use of variational inequalities. 
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